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1 Introduction
A common perspective is that sin taxes can correct individual ignorance toward detri-
mental effects on health (e.g. O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2006), the so-called paternalistic
view. However, an important aspect is the presence of fiscal externalities. Sin goods
affect not only individual health but also public funds. Excessive demand for alcohol
causes injuries and chronic diseases, raising hospitalization and the visits to emergency
departments which ultimately increase the fiscal burden (e.g. Bouchery et al., 2011). Thus,
sin taxes can be motivated even if individuals recognize the adverse effects of unhealthy
goods. We take a unified approach allowing for both paternalistic and non-paternalistic
motivation for sin taxes. The paternalistic view associates with individual ignorance
toward the detrimental impacts of sin goods on health. The non-paternalistic view is based
on fiscal externalities: if individuals do not fully internalize (1) the crowding-out effect on
health care resources while tackling short-term health problems (short-term externalities),
and (2) the relationship between individuals’ long-term health and the effectiveness of
health care services (long-term externalities).
2 The economy
The individual maximizes
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(c,x,L)dt, (1)
where ρ denotes the rate of time preference, c denotes numeraire goods, x denotes sin
goods, and L denotes leisure. L is
L ≡ (1− l)H(h), (2)
where l is the fraction of healthy time allocated to labor supply, and h is the stock of health.
h generates healthy time through a concave H function as in Grossman (1972). Individuals
own assets a and face the budget constraint and the law of motion of h respectively:
ȧ = (1− τk)ra+ (1− τl)wlH − c − (1 + τx)x − T , (3)
ḣ =M(m,εxx,εhh)− εηη(x)− δh, (4)
where Mm > 0, Mx < 0, ηx > 0, ηxx ≤ 0, and δ > 0. τk, τl , and τx represent taxes on capital
income, labor income, and sin goods, r and w are the prices of capital and labor, and T is a
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lump-sum tax. We normalize the after-tax price of c to unity without affecting the results.
Health can be accumulated (equation (4)) through effective health care M but deteriorates
in x via the η function and natural depreciation δ. M is affected by the provision of public
health-care spending m, consumption of x, and the level of h. The inclusion of x and h
captures the short- and long-term externalities on M. Short-term: although individuals
can use m to recover from short-term problems caused by x, they simultaneously crowd
out the resources available for other health problems and the opportunities to further
improve h. Long-term: as suggested by Grossman (1972), the marginal efficiency of m
decreases in h, implying that dḣ/dh < 0. Hence, Mh can be either positive or negative as
long as it is less than δ. We include 0 ≤ εx ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ εh ≤ 1 to represent the degree to
which individuals internalize the effects of x and h on M respectively. We further include
εη to allow for a paternalistic aspect of sin taxes. When εη < 1, individuals do not fully
understand the detrimental effect on own health when consuming x (thus having limited
cognitive ability).
The economy is constituted by two sectors: goods y and health m, which both require
capital k and labor lH as inputs. We assume that y has constant returns to scale.
y =f (sk,vlH), (5)
m =m((1− s)k, (1− v)lH), (6)
where s and v are the fractions of capital and labor devoted to the goods sector.
m is funded through taxes and government debt b:
τkra+ τlwlH + τxx+ T + ḃ =m+ rb, (7)
Furthermore, a = k + b.
We employ the primal approach, choosing allocations directly subject to the imple-
mentability constraint
λ0a0 =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[ucc −uLlH +uxx+ q(Mxεx − εηηx)x+ucT ]dt, (8)
where λ and q are the co-states (to ȧ and ḣ), the feasibility constraint
k̇ = f (sk,vlH)− c − x, (9)
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and the law of motion
ḣ =M(m((1− s)k, (1− v)lH),x,h)− η(x)− δh. (10)
To focus on the second-best case, we set T = 0.
We compare the marginal rates of substitution derived from the individual problem
and the Ramsey problem and obtain the optimal taxes1:
τk = 0, (11)
τl =
uL
γf2
[
Ω (∆L −∆c) +ψHh
(
ucL
uc
− uLL
uL
)]
, (12)
τx =
q
uc
(
Mxεx − εηηx
)
+
ux
γ
{
Ω
[
∆c −∆x −
q
ux
(
Mxεx − εηηx +
(
Mxxεx − εηηxx
)
x
)]
− ω
ux
(Mx − ηx) +ψ
(
q
ux
Mxhεh +
(
uxL
ux
− ucL
uc
)
Hh
)}
,
(13)
where
∆c ≡ 1 +
ucc
uc
c − ucL
uc
lH +
ucx
uc
x, (14)
∆x ≡ 1 +
ucx
ux
c − uxL
ux
lH +
uxx
ux
x, (15)
∆L ≡ 1 +
ucL
uL
c − uLL
uL
lH +
uxL
uL
x. (16)
Ω is the multiplier on the implementability constraint, ψ is the co-state on the private
shadow price of health, and ω is he social shadow price of health (equal to q in the first-
best). f2 denotes the derivative of f (sk,vlH) with respect to its second element. The zero
capital income tax result is well discussed in the existing studies (e.g. Judd, 1985; Chamley,
1986), and we will not elaborate further. In the first-best, where T is implementable, the
implementability constraint is nonbinding and Ω = ψ = 0; therefore, by equation (12),
τl = 0 in the first-best. τx is not necessarily zero in the first-best. A further exploration of
the structure of τx is provided in Section 3.
1Detailed derivations are provided in the Online Appendix
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3 Optimal sin taxes
We decompose equation (13) as
τx = τ
p
x + τex, (17)
where
τ
p
x =
uL
uc
× Hh
(ρ+ δ −Mhεh) (ρ+ δ −Mh)
[−Mx(ρ+ δ −Mh)(1− εx) +Mh(ηx −Mx)(1− εh)
+ ηx(ρ+ δ −Mh)(1− εη)],
(18)
and
τex =
Mx − ηx
γ
[
uLHh
ρ+ δ −Mh
(
γ
uc
− 1
)
−ω+ uLHh
ρ+ δ −Mh
]
+
ux
γ
{
Ω
[
∆c −∆x −
q
ux
(Mxεx − εηηx
+ (Mxxεx − εηηxx)x)
]
+ψ
[
q
ux
Mxhεh +
(
uxL
ux
− ucL
uc
)
Hh
]}
.
(19)
Proposition 1. The optimal sin tax is additively composed of an efficiency term τex and a
Pigouvian term τpx , where the latter is additive in the externality components.
Thus, the additivity result by Sandmo (1975) is found in our setting. τex in the first-
best, when T is available (Ω = 0). Equation (18) shows the corrective role of τx when
individuals do not fully internalize the fiscal externalities, or are aware of their own health
consequences. τx takes an additive structure in three non-negative terms. The first term is
related to the short-term fiscal externality in health care (1− εx), the second term to the
long-term fiscal externality (1− εh), and the third to the paternalistic aspect (1− εη). Thus,
even in absence of paternalism (εη = 1), τ
p
x would be positive as long as either εx or εh is
below unity.
4 Calibration
We calibrate the model on the UK economy 2005-2015, using the following functions:
u = lnc+θ lnx+φ lnL, (20)
H = hµ, (21)
η(x) = ηx, (22)
y = A(sk)α(vlH)(1−α), (23)
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m = B((1− s)k)β((1− v)lH)1−β , (24)
M = Emκmx−κxhκh . (25)
As a benchmark in the calibration, we take the non-paternalistic case (εη = 1). The pa-
rameters are calculated by using the first-order conditions of the individual maximization
problem. The results of the benchmark calibration are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibration
Parameters in the Literature Targeted Ratio Calibrated Parameters
α 0.3000a dm/dx 0.0430f s0 0.9324
β 0.2200a m0/(y0 +m0) 0.0900g v0 0.9007
κm 0.8000a x0/(y0 +m0) 0.0400g k0 5.7112
κh 0.0500b l0 0.2500a h0 6.9256
ρ 0.0400a y0 1∗ B 1.1912
δ 0.0430a A 1∗ E 2.0994
θ 0.2000c εx 0.5000
µ 0.4000d εh 0.4830
τk 0.2900e η 1.8947
τl 0.2600e
τx 0.1600e
[a]: Wang et al. (2017); [b]: Galama et al. (2012); [c]: Chen et al. (2017); [d]: Hall and Jones (2007); [e]:
McDaniel (2007); [f]: Scarborough et al. (2011); [g]: OECD Statistics; ∗: normalization to 1.
Subscripts 0 in Table 1 denote the initial values for calibration. Most calibrated
parameters are uniquely determined (to match the target ratios). However, E and η are
determined by εx and εh. Without data on those we proceed as follows. εx and εh lie
in a range 0− 1, and we compute the lowest possible E (=2.0756) and largest possible E
(=2.1231). Approaching this agnostically, we take E as the mean of these values. The value
of E then give the values of εx = 0.5, εh = 0.4830 and η = 1.8947.
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Figure 1: τpx and τx with different levels of m̄
The left panel in Figure 1 shows the first- and the second-best Pigouvian elements
with different levels of m̄. The second-best τpx are generally lower than those in the first-
best. The reason is that individuals value public goods less in the presence of τl , so
they can tolerate higher levels of externalities. This finding accords to Bovenberg and
Goulder (1996) in that the implementation of income taxes distorts the corrective taxes
downward. However, as shown in the right panel, lower levels of Pigouvian elements in
the second-best do not mean that the second-best τx are also lower. Referring to (19), the
efficiency elements could be non-zero in the second-best. Therefore, optimal sin taxes in
the second-best can still be higher than those in the first-best.
5 Sin tax reform
We further explore the property of sin taxes by computing changes in economic vari-
ables in response to revenue-neutral “sin tax reforms” which replaces τl and T with τx
respectively. Apart from the benchmark parameters (labeled NP , for non-paternalistic),
we also use an alternative parameter set with εη = 0.1 and η = 17.2121 (labeled P , for pa-
ternalistic). The latter is calibrated to yield the same initial steady states as the benchmark.
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Thus we are able to compare the effects of tax reforms in two different economies, one
where the initial equilibrium is generated by rational individuals (εη = 1), and one where
the initial equilibrium is generated by non-rational individuals (εη = 0.1).
Figure 2: The impacts of sin tax reforms on h, y and U
As seen in Figure 2, h, y and U all increase in τx. The reason is that τx discourages
x, and thereby improves h, which in turn increases productivity and output. There is a
larger response in output and welfare to the tax reform in the paternalistic case, though
quantitatively the difference is small. Thus we expect, quantitatively, close responses for
paternalistic and non-paternalistic economies due to an increase in the sin tax. Further-
more, there is a larger response when τl is lowered (as opposed to T ), also in magnitude.
In this sense, sin taxes contribute to double-dividends in terms of not only improving
population health but also enhancing both economic output and welfare.
6 Conclusion
This paper explores the structure of optimal sin taxes in the presence of income taxes
and the provision of health care in a dynamic general equilibrium model. We contribute
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to the literature with the following findings. First, we allow for both non-paternalistic (in
the presence of fiscal externalities) and paternalistic motivations to justify the role of sin
taxes. Second, we show the additive property between the Pigouvian elements and the
efficiency element in the optimal sin taxes in our dynamic setting. The overall Pigouvian
element can be further decomposed additively into a crowding-out and a paternalistic
component. In addition, our simulation shows that the Pigouvian taxes would be distorted
downward in the second-best. The reason behind this finding is that individuals can
tolerate more externalities since they value public goods less in the second-best. However,
with the presence of the efficiency element, the second-best optimal sin taxes are not
necessarily lower than those in the first-best. Third, we find that the implementation of sin
taxes has double-dividends which improve not only population health but also economic
performance and welfare in the UK.
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